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a b s t r a c t
Although the recent Great Recession had its origins in the housing sector, the short-term health impact of
the housing crisis is not well understood. We used longitudinal data to evaluate the impact of housing
payment problems on health status among home-owners and renters in 27 European states. Multi-level
and ﬁxed-effects models were applied to a retrospective cohort drawn from the EU Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions survey of employed persons, comprising those without housing arrears in the base
year 2008 and followed through to 2010 (n¼45,457 persons, 136,371 person-years). Multi-variate
models tested the impact of transitioning into housing payment arrears on self-reported health (0-worst
to 4-best), adjusting for confounders including age, sex, baseline health, and individual ﬁxed effects.
Transitioning into housing arrears was associated with a signiﬁcant deterioration in the health of renters
(0.09 units, 95% CI 0.05 to 0.13), but not owners (0.00, 95% CI 0.05 to 0.06), after adjusting for
individual ﬁxed effects. This effect was independent of and greater than the impact of job loss for the full
sample (0.05, 95% CI 0.002 to 0.09). The magnitude of this association varied across countries; the
largest adverse associations were observed for renters in Belgium, Austria, and Italy. There was no ob-
served protective association of differing categories of social protection or of the housing regulatory
structure for renters. Women aged 30 and over who rented appeared to have worse self-reported health
when transitioning into arrears than other groups. Renters also fared worse in those countries where
house prices were escalating. We therefore ﬁnd that housing payment problems are a signiﬁcant risk
factor for worse-self reported health in persons who are renting their homes. Future research is needed
to understand potential sources of health resilience among renters, especially at a time when housing
prices are rising in many European states.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction
The recent Great Recession had its origins in the U.S. housing
market, as growing numbers of people fell into rent or mortgage
arrears. However, research on the health effects of the recent crisis
has focused primarily upon the consequences of job loss and, to a
lesser extent, on homelessness, with relatively little attention paid
to impact of housing payment problems (Burgard & Kalousova,
2015). This is perhaps surprising given the importance of housing
as a determinant of health (Britten, 1934; Muir Gray, 1978; Pevalin,
Taylor, & Todd, 2008; Thomson & Thomas, 2015; Thomson, Tho-
mas, Sellstrom, & Petticrew, 2013; Winslow, 1937) and the large
number of families who have fallen into rent or mortgage arrears
during the recession, estimated to be around 3.5 million people
across Europe.
Yet as shown in Table 1, not all countries fared equally during
the Great Recession. Some countries, such as Italy, saw a slight
decline in arrears, falling from 4.3% in 2008 to 4.2% in 2010, while
Greece (among others) experienced a substantial rise, from 5.5% to
10.2% during this same period. These marked differences create a
unique opportunity to investigate how housing payment problems
inﬂuence health.
Housing arrears is one of the so-called ‘soft’ ways in which
housing inﬂuences health (Shaw, 2004), especially mental health,
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alongside the ‘hard’, physical impacts of the infrastructure itself,
such as damp, mould, and cold. A growing body of scholarship
indicates that people who experience housing insecurity, in-
dependent of other ﬁnancial difﬁculties, experience declines in
mental health (Gili, Roca, Basu, McKee, & Stuckler, 2012; Keene,
Cowan & Baker, 2015; Meltzer, Bebbington, Brugha, Farrell & Jen-
kins, 2013; Meltzer et al., 2011; Nettleton & Burrows, 1998). In
Australia, analysis of the longitudinal HILDA dataset found that
those in lower income households who had moved into un-
affordable housing experienced a worsening in mental health
(Bentley, Baker, Mason, Subramanian, & Kavanagh, 2011), with
male renters faring worse (Bentley, Baker & Mason, 2012; Mason,
Baker, Blakely, & Bentley, 2013). Similarly, research comparing US
cities found that foreclosures were associated with greater rates of
hospital visits (Currie & Tekin, 2011). A qualitative study in ﬁve US
cities, which included 14 focus groups of low- and mid-income
homeowners facing foreclosure as well as foreclosure avoidance
professionals, identiﬁed housing payment difﬁculties as a major
trigger of psychological feelings of insecurity and worse mental
health (Libman, Fields, & Saegert, 2012). Evidence from the US also
suggests that foreclosure and eviction during the housing crisis
was associated with increased suicide rates (Fowler, Gladden, Vagi,
Barnes, & Frazier, 2015; Houle & Light, 2014).
Here we seek to expand this literature by investigating how
housing payment arrears are related to people's health in Europe,
and, based on previous ﬁndings, how this impact varies across
countries, tenures and individual characteristics. The relationship
between housing payment arrears and health will likely vary ac-
cording to housing tenure given the different circumstances of
renters and owners in many nations. Renters tend to have fewer
savings, including a lack of equity associated with home owner-
ship, which may render housing hardship more hazardous (Ke-
meny, 1978; Lowe, 2004; Mason et al., 2013). Such differences in
outcomes by tenure have been identiﬁed in other nations includ-
ing Australia and the USA (Bentley et al., 2011; Bentley et al., 2012;
Mason et al., 2013), here we investigate whether the same is true
in Europe.
The health impacts of economic shocks such as job loss have
been shown to vary across countries dependent on social support
and protection, a stark example being the difference between
Iceland and Greece's responses and resulting health issues during
the Great Recession (Stuckler & Basu, 2013). Housing market
characteristics, such as prices and the ownership rate, vary con-
siderably across Europe, as do levels of social protection and in-
formal social support, such as social capital. Here we investigate
whether experiencing housing payment problems has different
consequences, including health impacts, depending on where a
person lives and what differences in social support may best ex-
plain this variation.
Both owners and renters risk housing payment problems, with
potentially differing consequences for health. Renters are more
likely to experience homelessness as a result of arrears, whereas
those who have mortgages face the potential additional loss of
substantial accumulated capital. However, owners may also have
greater resilience, resulting from greater ﬁnancial resources and
housing market options. To our knowledge, while it is very plau-
sible that renters may be more vulnerable than those with a
mortgage, few studies have sought to differentiate these groups
(Mason et al., 2013; Pollack, Grifﬁn, & Lynch, 2010).
The causes and consequences of transitioning into housing
payment arrears are similarly likely to vary according to individual
characteristics and life stages. Women, who often still take on the
bulk of caring duties, may experience a greater reduction in health
when facing payment problems than men, for example, although
Australian evidence suggests that men may fare worse and evi-
dence from Britain indicates men are more likely to seek medical
support (Nettleton & Burrows, 1998). Older people who fall into
arrears may have fewer options available to them, increasing the
risk of health consequences. In contrast, younger adults may have
fewer resources available, having had less time to accumulate
savings for example, but may have parental support.
Using the only source of longitudinal data from 27 European
nations which covers both housing and health data, we test the
hypotheses that transitioning into housing arrears worsens peo-
ple's health and that this effect is worse for renters than owners,
varies across countries and according to individual characteristics.
Methods
Data sources
We use the 2010 longitudinal EU-SILC dataset to construct a
retrospective cohort of employed persons who had no housing
payment arrears in 2008. Details of EU SILC have been described
elsewhere (Arora et al., 2015; Europa, 2015; Iacovou, Kaminska, &
Levy, 2012), but brieﬂy it uses a four-year rotating panel sample
with 25% of the sample being replaced in each wave. The precise
methods of data collection vary across the (then) 27 Member
States, although standards are set centrally. Following previous
analyses of effects of the Great Recession (Gili et al., 2012; Reeves,
Basu, Meissner, McKee, & Stuckler, 2013; Reeves, McKee, & Stuck-
ler, 2015; Stuckler, Basu, Meissner, Fishback, & McKee, 2012;
Stuckler, Basu, Suhrcke, Coutts, & McKee, 2009), we selected the
2010 dataset and used 2008 as the baseline year as, empirically, it
corresponds with the onset of the recession and associated rise in
housing payment arrears across Europe. Selecting this 3 year
period means that our analysis can cover the period of the re-
cession while ensuring a decent longitudinal sample size as fewer
Table 1
Prevalence of housing payment arrears in Europe, 2008 and 2010.
2008 2010 Change 2008–2010
Iceland 5.5 11.2 5.7
Greece 5.5 10.2 4.7
Slovakia 3.0 6.8 3.8
Latvia 3.2 5.8 2.6
Cyprus 3.4 5.6 2.2
Portugal 2.8 4.8 2.0
Spain 4.5 6.4 1.9
Hungary 3.8 5.6 1.8
Denmark 1.1 2.7 1.6
Estonia 1.1 2.7 1.6
Czech Republic 2.3 3.5 1.2
United Kingdom 3.7 4.8 1.1
Lithuania 0.5 1.3 0.8
Netherlands 2.4 3.1 0.7
EU 27 3.3 4.0 0.7
Sweden 1.7 2.3 0.6
Poland 0.6 1.0 0.4
France 5.8 6.1 0.3
Luxembourg 1.1 1.4 0.3
Finland 4.4 4.7 0.3
Bulgaria 1.5 1.7 0.2
Belgium 3.3 3.4 0.1
Austria 3.9 3.9 0.0
Romania 0.6 0.6 0.0
Italy 4.3 4.2 0.1
Norway 5.0 4.8 0.2
Slovenia 2.7 2.4 0.3
Malta 1.5 1.1 0.4
Notes: Data from Eurostat (n.d.). The average across the 27 countries was 0.7, as
such 13 countries are above average and 13 are below, with the Netherlands re-
porting the average number of arrears.
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sample rotations are lost than if a 4 year dataset were used. Only
those respondents that participated in all 3 surveys were included,
as limiting the sample in this way better enables us to look at the
effects of the transition into housing payment arrears including
through the use of ﬁxed-effects models, giving us health and ar-
rears information at 3 time points.
Longitudinal data were available for 25 of the then 27 EU
member states, the exceptions being Germany and Ireland. In
addition, we included data for Iceland and Norway, yielding a total
of 27 nations. The overall individual non-response rate (account-
ing for multiple interviews in the 2010 dataset) varies across
countries, from around 10% in Cyprus to over 40%, the maximum
non-response permitted by Eurostat, in Denmark and Norway
(Eurostat, 2012). EU-SILC requires representative probabilistic
samples, which was achieved in all the countries with the ex-
ception of Spain, which used substitution methods to replace non-
respondents (Arora et al., 2015). Population registers and censuses
were used to assess the representativeness of the samples (Euro-
stat, 2012).
Respondents were selected for analysis on the basis of being
aged 16 or over, not living in rent free accommodation and being
both employed and not in housing payment arrears in 2008. These
restrictions were applied to ensure that the analysis would capture
those most affected by the recession rather than those already
experiencing difﬁculty. This resulted in a sample size of 136,371
person/year responses (45,457 individuals) with country sample
sizes varying between 294 person/years for Bulgaria and over
14,000 for France and The Netherlands.
Transitioning into housing payment arrears was a dichotomous
measure of whether a household entered into arrears across sur-
vey waves, as assessed by the following question: “In the last
twelve months, has the household been in arrears, i.e. has been
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for outcome and predictor variables in retained sample.
2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%) Data source
Individual variables
Good Health (0 worst-4 best) 3.12 3.09 3.07 EU SILC
Housing payment arrears No arrears 45 457 (100%) 39 654 (96.3%) 39 991 (96.0%)
Arrears 0 1508 (3.66%) 1672 (4.01%)
Tenure Owner-occupier 34 226 (75.3%) 34 864 (76.8%) 35 326 (77.8%)
Private rent 7967 (17.5%) 7534 (16.6%) 7282 (16.0%)
Reduced rent 3256 (7.16%) 3021 (6.65%) 2794 (6.15%)
Age 41.4 42.4 43.4
Gender Male 24 111 (53.0%) 24 111 (53.0%) 24 111 (53.0%)
Female 21 346 (47.0%) 21 346 (47.0%) 21 346 (47.0%)
Marital status Married 28 613 (63.0%) 29 067 (64.1%) 29 463 (64.9%)
Never married 12 607 (27.8%) 11 993 (26.4%) 11 504 (25,4%)
Separated/divorced 3594 (7.92%) 3706 (8.17%) 3756 (8.28%)
Widowed 579 (1.28%) 607 (1.34%) 654 (1.44%)
Education level Primary only 2411 (5.37%) 2359 (5.24%) 2337 (5.19%)
Secondary only 26 007 (57.9%) 25 872 (57.5%) 25 840 (57.36%)
Post-secondary 16 472 (36.7%) 16 761 (37.3%) 16 874 (37.5%)
Disposable income (1000 s) 43.7 44.5 44.5
Chronic illness at baseline No 29 658 (80.3%) – –
Yes 7293 (19.7%) – –
Limiting illness at baseline No 32 393 (87.7%) – –
Yes 3760 (10.2%) – –
Yes, strongly limiting 781 (2.1%) – –
Economic activity Employed 45 457 (100%) 41 637 (92.0%) 40 528 (89.6%)
Unemployed – 1530 (3.38%) 1812 (4.01%)
Retired – 750 (1.66%) 1343 (2.97%)
Other inactive – 1312 (2.90%) 1549 (3.42%)
Population level variables
Housing EEE (Eurostat, 2015)
Home-ownership rate 75.6% 73.5% 73.1%
Change in house prices 2.55 5.10 1.72
Arrears rate 3.39% 4.06% 4.47%
Macroeconomic
Change in GDP 142 2330 1220
Interest rate 4.53% 4.23% 3.78%
Social spending (Purchasing Power Standard per inhabitant, divided by 100)
Disability 5.27 5.11 5.15
Total welfare 58.27 58.53 59.48
Old age 22.79 22.99 23.79
Survival beneﬁts 3.41 3.33 3.37
Health 16.99 16.66 16.63
Family and child 5.30 5.15 5.18
Unemployment 2.54 3.27 3.31
Housing 0.78 0.79 0.76
Social Capital (EVS, 2008)
Most people can be trusted 34.31 – –
People helpful most of the time 36.78 – –
Sample countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia,
Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the UK.
Housing payment arrears and economic activity other than employed are zero in 2008 due to sample constraints. House price data are missing for Norway and Iceland.
Interest rates missing for Norway, Iceland and Estonia. Social capital data missing for Iceland, Spain and the Czech Republic. Rental regulation information is missing for
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Malta, Norway, Romania, and Slovenia.
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unable to pay on time due to ﬁnancial difﬁculties for: (a) rent
(b) mortgage repayment, for the main dwelling?”
Following convention we assessed self-reported health using a
scale from 0 – very bad to 4 – very good (Singh-Manoux et al.,
2006). It is well-known that self-reported health is subject to
perceptual and cultural biases (Jürges, 2007; Zimmer, Natividad,
Lin, & Chayovan, 2000). However it is a widely used indicator of
individual health and correlates strongly with mortality in many
countries, provides a summary of overall health problems, and,
when measured repeatedly in the same individuals, avoids po-
tential cross-cultural biases (Ganna & Ingelsson, 2015; Jylhä, 2009).
Statistical models
We use individual ﬁxed effect models to investigate the re-
lationship between housing payment arrears and health, as fol-
lows:
= α + β + β + β
+ β +γ +ε ( )
Health Arrears Age Income
DEM 1
i j k i j k i j k i j k
i j k i j k
, , 0 1 , , 2 , , 3 , ,
n , , i , ,
Here i is individual, j is country, and k is year. γi represents the
individual ﬁxed effects and εi,j,k the individual error term. DEM
Table 3
Estimated impact of transitioning into housing payment arrears on self-reported health, 2008–2010, baseline sample of individuals not in arrears and employed.
Full sample Owners Renters
Covariate Unadjusted multilevel Adjusted multilevel model Individual Fixed effects Individual Fixed effects Individual Fixed effects
Housing payment arrears 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.06** 0.00 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age - 0.03*** 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age2 - 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female - 0.04*** - - -
(0.00)
Marital status
Married - 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.15**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Separated or divorced - 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Widowed - 0.08*** 0.10 0.18 0.37
(0.02) (0.12) (0.10) (0.21)
Never married - Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Education level
Post-secondary - 0.21*** 0.03 0.03 0.05
(0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Secondary - 0.10*** 0.02 0.00 0.03
(0.01) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Primary - Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Tenure
Private rent - 0.06*** 0.03 - -
(0.01) (0.02)
Reduced rent - 0.06*** 0.01 - -
(0.01) (0.02)
Owner occupier Ref. Ref. - -
Disposable income (1000 s) - 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Chronic Illness at baseline year (yes) - 0.41*** - - -
(0.01)
Limiting illness at baseline year
Yes, strongly limiting - 0.82*** - - -
(0.02)
Yes - 0.41*** - - -
(0.01)
No - Ref. - - -
Economic activity
Lost job – 0.09*** 0.05* 0.03 0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Retired – 0.05** 0.02 0.05 0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Other inactive – 0.12*** 0.04 0.03 0.05
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Employed – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Individual ﬁxed effects N N Y Y Y
Country-level variables N N Y Y Y
Number of individual-years 103041 101155 91547 65264 26285
Countries in sample 27 27 24 24 24
Note: Renters include those who rent at a reduced rate and market rate. Country-level variables are those population level variables given in Table 2. Multilevel models
account for within-individual (time), household and country-level clustering.
* po 0.05.
** p o 0.01.
*** p o 0.001.
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represents a vector of control variables, including marital status,
education level, and housing tenure. All models are clustered by
country to reﬂect non-independence of sampling. All regression
models were weighted by person weights, to represent popula-
tions. Multilevel analysis with household and country level clus-
tering is also conducted. To facilitate interpretation of results we
standardised the health outcome for analysis.
In subsequent models we evaluated a range of potential mod-
ifying factors using a series of interaction terms. These potential
modiﬁers included country-level macroeconomic risks, social ca-
pital and support, and social protection expenditure, as well as age
and gender. All models were performed using Stata 13 (xtreg and
xtmixed commands). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the study.
Results
Association of transitioning into housing payment arrears and health
status
Table 3 shows the results of a series of multi- and single-level
statistical models progressively incorporating control variables. As
shown in the ﬁrst column, the unadjusted association of transi-
tioning into housing payment arrears with worse health, con-
trolling for household and country clustering, is 0.10 units (95%
CI: 0.07 to 0.12). After adjusting for baseline health, education,
and potential confounding factors, the association was slightly
attenuated to 0.07 (95% CI: 0.05 to 0.10). Including in-
dividual ﬁxed effects yielded the most conservative estimated
association of 0.06 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.10).
We then disaggregated these associations by owners and ren-
ters, proceeding with the individual ﬁxed effects regression
Table 4
Association of transitioning into housing payment arrears on self-reported health
among renters.
Age Gender
Women Men All
Under 30 0.08 0.06 0.00
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
30–59 0.17*** 0.06 0.11***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
60 and over 1.12*** 0.31 0.40
(0.04) (0.18) (0.22)
All 0.12** 0.08* 0.09***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Notes: Results presented from 12 separate ﬁxed effects statistical models. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
* po 0.05,
** p o 0.01,
*** po 0.001.
Fig. 1. Estimated impact of housing payment arrears on self-reported health with 95% conﬁdence intervals, 2008–2010.
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models. As shown in Table 3, there was no signiﬁcant association
between housing payment arrears and health among owners
(0.00, 95% CI: 0.05 to 0.06), but there was among renters (0.09,
95% CI: 0.05 to 0.13).
Next we further investigated whether these impacts were dif-
ferent by age and sex, focusing on renters. As shown in Table 4,
presenting 12 separate ﬁxed effects models, we observed that
associations were greatest among women aged 30 to 59 (0.17,
Fig. 2. Estimated impact of housing payment arrears on self-reported health with 95% conﬁdence intervals, 2008–2010, by tenure.
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95% CI 0.09 to 0.26) and particularly women aged 60 and over
(1.12, 95% CI 1.03 –to 1.21). These results are in contrast to
results from Australia, which indicated that male renters fared
worse when facing housing payment difﬁculties (Bentley et al.,
2011, 2012).
Cross-national differences in the impact of housing payment arrears
Having observed that renters had worse health, we next in-
vestigated differing impacts across countries. Figs. 1 and 2 plot the
country-speciﬁc associations of transitioning into housing pay-
ment arrears with self-reported health, both overall (Fig. 1), and
disaggregated by tenure (Fig. 2). The estimated impact varied
considerably. In some countries, there was no effect of housing
payment arrears, while in others, such as Poland, the negative
effect of arrears on health is considerably larger than average
(0.36 compared to the average 0.07, both po0.05). Although
there are a few exceptions, we observed that in the majority of
countries, including those diverse as Belgium, Iceland, Austria, and
Sweden, renters are much worse off than owners when facing
housing payment arrears.
Next we sought to investigate potential factors which may
exacerbate or mitigate this impact, given the marked variation
across countries. First we investigated characteristics of the
housing market using a series of interaction terms. Table 5 shows
the results. We observed that in countries with greater prevalence
of homeownership, both owners and renters appeared to have
slightly attenuated health risks associated with experiencing
housing payment arrears. Additionally, rising housing prices ap-
peared to exacerbate the estimated impact of housing payment
arrears on health status.
We then tested whether greater rental market regulation was
protective, using binary measures taken from a European Com-
mission Study (Cuerpo, Kalantaryan, & Pontuch, 2014). These
binary measures capture whether a country has a higher level of
tenancy protection, either through rent controls or favourable
positioning of tenants in negotiations with landlords. None found
a signiﬁcant interaction with housing payment arrears.
Finally we included a set of formal and informal social support
measures. The formal ones included alternative categories of social
protection expenditure, including housing support, old-age
spending, healthcare, family support and unemployment beneﬁts.
The informal ones involved social capital factors, the proportion in
a country responding that people are helpful most of the time and
whether people can be trusted. None of the many variables tested
had a signiﬁcant protective effect on the housing payment arrears-
health status association.
Robustness checks
Thus far we have treated the health outcomes as a scale vari-
able for ease of interpretation. However treating health in this way
may have affected our results. We check this by re-running the
models shown in Table 3 using ordinal analyses, the results of
which are given in Appendix Table A1. The results of these models
are consistent with the linear approach, ﬁnding that housing
payment arrears is associated with deterioration in health for the
full sample, which reﬂects a large effect for renters and a non-
signiﬁcant effect for owners when disaggregated by tenure.
As a further check we run a number of longitudinal linear
probability models where the self-reported health outcome has
been transformed into a binary variable (Good/very good health
coded as 0, fair/bad/very bad as 1). The results of these models are
given in Appendix Table A2. The ﬁndings are equivalent to our
previous models, ﬁnding that housing payment arrears is asso-
ciated with an increased risk of reporting poor health, which when
disaggregated by tenure reﬂects a large risk for renters and no
statistically signiﬁcant risk for owners.
In order to further investigate the differences found across te-
nures we investigate whether the differing characteristics of
owners and renters may account for some of the variation found.
Web Appendix Table A3 gives the descriptives for the sample
disaggregated by tenure. As would be expected there are differ-
ences in the characteristics of individuals in these different te-
nures. We ran ﬁxed-effects interaction models (equivalent to the
third model in Table 3) for all of the time-varying individual-level
predictors to investigate whether any differences in sample char-
acteristics may help us to further understand the health con-
sequences of housing payment arrears. Only one signiﬁcant in-
teraction was found, indicating that widow(er)s report higher
health when living in reduced rate rented homes.
Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates that transitioning into housing
payment arrears is a signiﬁcant risk factor for worsening health
Table 5
Interaction of potential modifying factors with the housing payment arrears-health
association, baseline sample of individuals not in arrears and employed, multilevel
analysis.
Modifying factor Owners Renters
Macroeconomic
Home ownership rate 0.006** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002)
House price change 0.004* 0.006*
(0.002) (0.003)
GDP change 0.00 0.002*
(0.00) (0.001)
Interest rate 0.00 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Country arrears rate 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Social Capital
People are helpful most of the time 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Most people can be trusted 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Social protection expenditure
Disability spending 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
Total social protection spending 0.001* 0.00
(0.001) (0.00)
Old age social protection spending 0.004* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002)
Survival beneﬁts spending 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Health spending 0.005* 0.00
(0.002) (0.00)
Family and child spending 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
Unemployment spending 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Housing spending 0.05** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Rental market regulations
Rent controls 0.04 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Tenant-landlord relationship 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Note: Models include all individual level control variables as used in the previous
table, separate models run for each potential interaction. Standard errors in par-
entheses
***po0.001.
* po0 .05.
** po 0.01.
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status across Europe. We found that these negative associations
were concentrated in renters, especially women aged 30 and over.
However, in most countries, a short term period of housing arrears
had no identiﬁable impact on owners’ health status. Escalating
house prices appeared to render renters more vulnerable to the
health consequences of payment problems.
As with all observational studies, our analysis has several lim-
itations. First, reﬂecting the availability of comparative data, we
focused on the ﬁnancial aspects of housing. This does not reﬂect
the many aspects of housing difﬁculties, including low quality or
substandard housing. Second, although our analysis utilised the
longest series of available comparative longitudinal data for a large
number of European countries, it still is limited to a relatively
short duration. This makes the effects observed more likely to
reﬂect mental, rather than physical health, many of which would
require longer time periods to develop. Further research is also
needed to investigate the longer-term consequences and potential
scarring effects of housing insecurity. Third, we failed to identify
statistically signiﬁcant protective factors, whether from social
protection or social capital. This may reﬂect a low degree of sta-
tistical power when these protective factors are observed at the
country level or the crude nature of such measures which do not
capture how, as well as how much, money is spent. Given the
number of countries included in our study and the complexity and
variety that characterises housing policy, it has not been possible
to thoroughly investigate the relative protections afforded to
owners and renters across countries. Additional studies are nee-
ded to understand the reasons for the considerable differences
across nations in the risks faced by renters. Fourth, one strength of
our study is that we were able to adjust for baseline health and
identify changes in persons who experienced new payment pro-
blems. While we adjust for baseline health it remains possible that
people's health may inﬂuence their likelihood of falling to housing
payment arrears given the period of time between data collection
points. However we believe this unlikely given our analytical ap-
proach. The controls for individual ﬁxed effects may also yield
conservative estimates of the association of housing with worse
health status. Fifth, again reﬂecting the lack of available com-
parative data for a large number of EU countries, we were unable
to disaggregate those facing housing payment problems of differ-
ent levels of severity.
Our study points to several directions for future research,
which should be a priority given that difﬁculties in the housing
sector are likely to persist in Europe. One is to account for not only
demand-side factors, which shape people's ability to afford
housing, but also supply-side factors, which may help contain
escalating housing costs, such as rent controls and provision of
social housing. Further research is needed to develop and use
better measures of rental controls and negotiating power of ren-
ters, likely necessitating new data collection across Europe.
Several observations of outliers are noteworthy. We observed
that, in contrast to the general trend in Europe, owners in Poland
had greater risk of health problems than did renters. This may
reﬂect exposure to foreign currency debt, used in some nations to
purchase homes. Approximately 60% of Polish mortgages were
denominated in foreign currency, often from Swiss banks, expos-
ing them to exchange rate ﬂuctuations that may not have been
anticipated (Miles & Pillonca, 2008). In Austria and Belgium ren-
ters who experience housing payment arrears appeared to fare
particularly poorly compared with owners and the rest of Europe.
Such unanticipated shocks, which occur outside the control of
individuals, may be particularly deleterious. This is also consistent
with our observation that escalating housing prices in a nation
appeared to exacerbate the impacts of arrears on health status.
In some European countries, especially parts of the UK, housing
prices have risen and are projected to remain high. While policies
are in place in some countries to subsidise and support people
experiencing arrears, less attention has been paid to intervening
directly in the market to render housing more affordable. In some
cases, policies designed to facilitate home ownership have per-
versely increased prices, so worsening the risk to health. For ex-
ample in the UK (particularly England) ofﬁcial policies have the
effect of maintaining or increasing already high house prices, ei-
ther directly or through encouraging the perception of housing as
an asset, with examples including ‘Buy to Let’ and ‘Help to Buy’,
although April 2016 tax changes have made the former less at-
tractive for landlords, with as yet unknown consequences.
Overall our results suggest that, similar to job loss, housing
payment arrears is a major public health concern especially in
times of economic downturn and hardship. As well as seeking to
reduce instances of housing payment arrears, research should in-
vestigate how to mitigate the impacts of arrears on health, and
understand why some groups are more severely affected than
others.
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Table A1
Estimated impact of transitioning into housing payment arrears on self-reported health, 2008–2010, baseline sample of individuals not in arrears and employed, ordinal
models.
Covariate Full sample Owners Renters
Unadjusted multilevel Adjusted multilevel model Longitudinal ordinal RE Longitudinal ordinal RE Longitudinal ordinal RE
Housing payment arrears 0.42*** 0.31*** 0.21* 0.02 0.43***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Age – 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.15***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age2 – 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female – 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.14* 0.32***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Marital status
Married – 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.10
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Separated or divorced – 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.01
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
Widowed – 0.27** 0.26* 0.32* 0.13
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.17)
Never married – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Education level
Post-secondary – 0.94*** 1.17*** 1.16*** 1.18***
(0.05) (0.17) (0.20) (0.14)
Secondary – 0.44*** 0.61*** 0.63** 0.55***
(0.05) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14)
Primary – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Tenure
Private rent – 0.27*** 0.12 - -
(0.03) (0.07)
Reduced rent – 0.31*** 0.25** - -
(0.04) (0.07)
Owner occupier – Ref. Ref. - -
Disposable income (1000 s) – 0.004*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01**
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Chronic Illness at baseline year
(yes)
– 1.81*** 1.85*** 1.90*** 1.70***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Limiting illness at baseline year
Yes, strongly limiting – 3.09*** 3.13*** 3.18*** 3.05***
(0.09) (0.19) (0.20) (0.27)
Yes – 1.63*** 1.72*** 1.77*** 1.66***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14)
No – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Economic activity
Lost job – 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.43** 0.31**
(0.05) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12)
Retired – 0.18* 0.16 0.08 0.30
(0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16)
Other inactive – 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.35**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
Employed – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Individual ﬁxed effects N N N N N
Country-level variables N N Y Y Y
Number of individual-years 103041 101155 92931 66026 26907
Countries in sample 27 27 24 24 24
Note: Renters include those who rent at a reduced rate and market rate. Country-level variables are those population level variables given in Table 2. Multilevel models
account for within-individual (time), household and country-level clustering. Log odds coefﬁcients. Fixed effects models not available, all models unweighted as weighting
not supported
* p o 0.05.
** p o 0.01.
*** p o 0.001.
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Table A2
Estimated impact of transitioning into housing payment arrears on self-reported health, 2008–2010, baseline sample of individuals not in arrears and employed, longitudinal
linear probability models with ﬁxed effects.
Covariate Full sample Owners Renters
Unadjusted
longitudinal
Adjusted longitudinal Longitudinal with country
vars
Longitudinal with country
vars
Longitudinal with country
vars
Housing payment arrears 0.05*** 0.04** 0.04** 0.00 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age – 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Age2 – 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female – – – – –
Marital status
Married – 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Separated or divorced – 0.04** 0.04** 0.02 0.07*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Widowed – 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11)
Never married – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Education level
Post-secondary – 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Secondary – 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Primary – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Tenure
Private rent – 0.00 0.00 – –
(0.01) (0.01)
Reduced rent – 0.02 0.01 – -
(0.01) (0.01)
Owner occupier – Ref. Ref. – –
Disposable income (1000 s) – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Chronic Illness at baseline
year (yes)
– – – – –
Limiting illness at baseline year
Yes, strongly limiting – – – – –
Yes – – – – –
No – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Economic activity
Lost job – 0.03** 0.03* 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Retired – 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
Other inactive – 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employed – Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Individual ﬁxed effects N N N N N
Country-level variables N N Y Y Y
Number of individual-years 101483 99749 91547 65264 26285
Countries in sample 27 27 24 24 24
Note: Renters include those who rent at a reduced rate and market rate. Country-level variables are those population level variables given in Table 2. Good/very good health
coded as 0, fair/bad/very bad as 1. Fixed effects with clustered standard errors.
* p o0 .05.
** p o 0.01.
*** p o0 .001.
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Table A3
Sample descriptives disaggregated by tenure.
Owners Renters Statistical test
(difference)
Housing payment
arrears
1.95% 4.09% p o0 .05
Age 43.04 (S.D. 10.70) 40.39 (S.D.
11.74)
p o 0.05
Marital status Married 69.58% 45.80% p o 0.05
Single 22.51% 39.62%
Divorced 6.65% 12.94%
Widowed 1.26% 1.64%
Education Primary 3.84% 9.93% p o 0.05
Secondary 56.43% 61.44%
Post-secondary
39.73%
28.63%
Disposable income 47665.13
(36255.76)
33083.15
(25852.57)
p o 0.05
Chronic illness 19.60% 20.12% p o 0.05
Limiting illness No 88.29% 86.04% p o 0.05
Yes 9.76% 11.38%
Strongly limiting
1.95%
2.58%
Economic activity Employed 94.54% 91.80% p o 0.05
Unemployed 1.99% 4.01%
Retired 1.52% 1.62%
Inactive 1.96% 2.57%
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